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Article
Do Courts Engage in a Sufficiency Analysis When 
Making Daubert Rulings in Toxic Tort Cases?
JOSEPH SANDERS & MICHAEL D. GREEN
Courts and commentators continue to wrestle with how questions 
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony relate to questions of 
sufficiency of the evidence. In an earlier article, we explained that many 
courts determine the admissibility of an expert opinion based on whether the 
scientific evidence proffered by the expert supports a reasonable inference 
of causation. What’s more, we claimed that this is not a bad thing and better 
than using inappropriate Daubert factors to decide admissibility. A key 
distinction to appreciate is that between global sufficiency and local 
sufficiency. Just as courts may take a case from the jury if there is insufficient 
evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to reach a certain outcome, a
judge should exclude an expert when the data upon which the expert relies 
is insufficient to support the expert’s conclusion. We defend this approach 
against several normative critiques.
The earlier paper relied on anecdotal case examples to support our
descriptive claim. This paper draws upon two samples of cases to ascertain 
the prevalence of courts employing a sufficiency analysis when deciding 
whether to admit expert testimony. We find that in toxic tort cases when 
courts exclude expert testimony, a significant majority of them do engage in 
a local sufficiency analysis.
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Do Courts Engage in a Sufficiency Analysis When 
Making Daubert Rulings in Toxic Tort Cases?
JOSEPH SANDERS & MICHAEL D. GREEN*
INTRODUCTION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 the United States 
Supreme Court established a new method of assessing the admissibility of 
expert testimony in federal courts.2 Daubert, and two subsequent opinions,3
have fundamentally changed the likelihood that the testimony of expert 
witnesses in civil cases will be excluded prior to trial.4 As a result, the 
testimony of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of experts has been excluded in 
whole or in part. However, confusion persists as to how trial courts should 
approach the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.
In an earlier article, we argued that much of the confusion exists because 
of the continuing uncertainty about the relationship of two related concepts 
in the Daubert analysis: admissibility and sufficiency.5 We then went on to 
“argue that the best way to clarify the issue is to appreciate that most 
admissibility decisions regarding expert testimony are best understood as 
sufficiency judgments about the scientific evidence supporting the expert’s
                                                                                                                         
* Joseph Sanders is A.A. White Professor, University of Houston Law Center. Michael D. Green is 
Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 Id. at 587–95 (outlining the new test and underlying reasoning for the change in admissibility 
standards).
3 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that abuse of discretion is the 
appropriate standard to review a court’s decision to admit or exclude expert evidence); Kumho Tire 
Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony and 
that courts should focus on “the case at hand”). The Daubert trilogy applies only to admissibility rulings 
in the federal courts. However, over time most state courts have followed suit. See Michael Morgenstern, 
Daubert v. Frye—A State-by-State Comparison, THE EXPERT INSTITUTE (2017), 
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-a-state-by-state-comparison/? 
[https://perma.cc/GDC2-4GRB] (listing thirty-nine states that have adopted a Daubert-like test).  
4 The effect has been much less profound in criminal cases. Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, 
Admissibility Versus Sufficiency: Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony, 50 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2015); see also Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently?: Proof of 
Individual Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (2010) 
(noting an ongoing discussion surrounding inconsistencies found within jurisdictions, specifically 
between civil and criminal cases); Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 890–
93 (2013) (discussing the claim that the Daubert test is applied “more lackadaisically” in criminal cases, 
specifically in reference to expert testimony put forth by the prosecution). 
5 Green & Sanders, supra note 4, at 1057, 1095.
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testimony.”6 We argued that this is the best way to approach the issue under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702,7 and we also argued that a “close reading of 
opinions reveals that many courts do adopt a sufficiency approach when 
making admissibility rulings.”8 In support of our position, we offered up 
multiple cases in which the court employed a sufficiency rationale in its 
Daubert decision. Our proposal has been met with several criticisms. In this 
Article, we clarify our position and respond to those critiques.
The earlier article did not attempt to conduct a systematic review of 
Daubert cases to test this hypothesis. In this Article, however, we attempt 
just that task. We report the results of reviewing a sample of cases to 
determine whether when judges exclude all of a party’s experts, they have 
determined that the proffered scientific data is insufficient to support an 
expert’s conclusion and, when the testimony of the expert is essential to the 
party’s case, the data is insufficient to support a verdict for the party seeking 
to introduce the testimony. 
Part II of this Article reviews the three Supreme Court opinions and our 
argument that together they may be understood as being about sufficiency. 
We note that revised Rule 702 permits courts to incorporate sufficiency 
considerations when ruling on admissibility. Finally, Part II provides 
illustrative examples from our first article of opinions that explicitly or 
implicitly rule on Daubert admissibility based on sufficiency considerations.  
Part III addresses two types of criticisms of our position. The first 
critique is normative. It argues that for various reasons it is important to 
maintain a bright line between the concepts of admissibility and sufficiency. 
The second critique is empirical. This critique argues that our anecdotal 
approach cherry-picked examples of opinions adopting a substantive 
approach. As we discuss below,9 some courts do explicitly state that 
admissibility does not involve a sufficiency analysis.10
We briefly review and respond to the normative objections and then turn 
our attention to the primary focus of the Article: whether courts do routinely 
adopt a sufficiency analysis when deciding whether to admit expert 
testimony.
                                                                                                                         
6 Id. at 1057, 1095.
7 FED. R. EVID. 702. This is not necessarily the case for admissibility decisions under Rules 401, 
701, or 703.
8 Green & Sanders, supra note 4, at 1058.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 58, 95–99.
10 See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prod. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In addition, 
the alleged flaws identified by the court go to the weight of Dr. Smith’s opinion, not its admissibility. 
There is an important difference between what is unreliable support and what a trier of fact may conclude 
is insufficient support for an expert’s conclusion.”). For a critique of Milward and other liberal 
admissibility decisions, see David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 31–41 (2013) (discussing admissibility rules prior to Daubert).
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Before proceeding, we should explain that our earlier article observed 
that the Daubert factors were not “well-suited” to determine the reliability 
of expert testimony about scientific causation.11 For example, there is no 
way to determine an error rate for epidemiologic or toxicologic studies nor 
even for secondary evidence such as adverse reaction reports or chemical 
structure similarity.12 Similarly, determining specific causation—whether 
the agent caused the plaintiff’s disease—is not a matter that scientists 
interested in causation explore and thus, the publication and peer review 
factors, among others, are not helpful in assessing the reliability of such 
testimony.13 This mismatch produced conflict, confusion, and incoherence14
in the cases, which, of course, was part of the motivation for writing the first 
article. In Part IV, we discuss several ways in which this confusion manifests 
itself. In the process, we refine our understanding of what it means to adopt 
a sufficiency approach to admissibility. We then set forth our effort 
empirically to assess a group of cases to test whether courts actually use a 
sufficiency approach as we now understand it, and we report our findings.
Part V briefly compares the results of our analysis of these cases with a 
group of cases where we believe the court’s use of a non-sufficiency analysis 
would be greatest. Part VI concludes with a discussion of how these results 
relate to our original argument, both methodologically and normatively.
I. THE DAUBERT TRILOGY
A. Before Daubert
Prior to the rise of mass torts, exclusion of expert testimony in civil cases 
was extremely rare.15 The Frye general-acceptance limitation on expert 
                                                                                                                         
11 Green & Sanders, supra note 4, at 1068.
12 Id. at 1070.
13 Id. at 1094.
14 Id. at 1057 (introducing the issues stemming from the creation of the Daubert analysis).
15 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
1999, 2008 (1994) (reporting that “Frye had been applied almost exclusively to criminal cases and was 
not applied in a federal civil case until 1984”); Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s
Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1637, 1695 (1993) (“There [was] not a single case decided by the 
federal appellate courts prior to 1975 that applied the Frye rule in a civil case of any kind. As of 
April 7, 1993, only three such decisions had been reported, two of which were decided in 1991.”). One 
of these cases was the circuit court opinion in Daubert. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). Another case cited by Cheseboro is Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,
939 F.2d 1106, 1110–12 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992). Whether Christophersen
really “relies” on Frye might be questioned, since the court listed four considerations, of which Frye is 
only one. The final case is Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 
(5th Cir. 1984). As Susan Haack notes, Barrel of Fun is a fire insurance fraud case excluding 
“psychological stress evaluation” testimony, “which the court held to be essentially similar to polygraph 
evidence, which was the kind of evidence at issue in Frye.” Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism 
of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253, 258 n.24 (2008).
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testimony was employed almost exclusively in criminal cases.16 The norm 
was simply to admit all expert testimony and allow juries to give it the 
weight they felt it deserved. To some extent, the modern “gatekeeping” 
adopted by Daubert was not needed in an era before the rise of mass toxic 
torts and the liberalization of the admissibility of expert testimony in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.17 Things began to change due to a series of 
opinions in two mass toxic torts, Agent Orange18 and the Bendectin cases,19
                                                                                                                         
Our own research found two additional toxic substances cases that mention Frye. One is Brock v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. In that case, Judge Higginbotham cited Frye in his dissent to the denial of a 
rehearing en banc. 884 F.2d 167, 168–69 (5th Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The other case, 
Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., cited Frye critically and concluded that the dispute over the validity 
of the methodology in certain epidemiologic studies should be submitted to the jury, rather than decided 
by the judge. 745 F.2d 292, 303–04 (4th Cir. 1984).
16 Giannelli, supra note 15, at 2008 (“The civil cases, spurred by toxic tort litigation, also came 
later. Frye had been applied almost exclusively to criminal cases and was not applied in a federal civil 
case until 1984.”).
17 See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 306 (1996) (discussing how the expansion of liability theories resulted in 
courts becoming “chronically overwhelmed” by the new flood of litigation).
18 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In the Agent 
Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein granted defendants summary judgment in individual suits brought by 
veterans who opted out of the class action settlement. Id. at 1264. He based his opinion on Rule 703, 
concluding that the facts and data (i.e., scientific evidence) relied on by plaintiff’s experts did not suffice 
as a basis for their opinions: “If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that 
no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must be 
excluded.” Id. at 1245.
Peter Schuck has chronicled the Agent Orange litigation and explained why Judge Weinstein, in 
order to protect a global class-wide settlement that he had largely masterminded through his appointed 
special master, Kenneth Feinberg, felt the necessity to dismiss all of the opt-out claims by veterans. 
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 226–45 (1986) 
(discussing in depth Judge Weinstein’s approach to the opt-out cases); see also Charles Nesson, Agent 
Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontiers of Knowledge, 66 B.U.L. REV. 521, 536–37 
(1986) (discussing how Judge Weinstein avoided a “long road” through the use of his settlement 
strategy).
19 The critical issue in all of the Bendectin cases was whether Bendectin caused the birth defects, 
most typically limb reduction defects, in children who were exposed to it in utero. Among the many 
relevant Bendectin cases, we should call special attention to one: Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988). One of the plaintiff’s experts, 
Dr. Alan Done, testified that Bendectin was a tertatogen and that it caused the plaintiff’s birth defect. 
Unlike Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange, Judge Jackson denied the defendant’s motion for a summary 
judgment and tried the case. Defense experts countered with a group of epidemiologic studies that found 
no significant increase in limb defects in infants whose mothers used Bendectin. After a jury verdict, 
Judge Jackson granted judgment for the defendant relying on the epidemiologic evidence proffered by 
the defendant’s experts and discounting non-epidemiologic evidence relied on by the plaintiff’s experts 
because it was neither published nor peer reviewed. Id. at 801–02.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision, but it did so by ruling that the plaintiffs’
experts’ testimony was inadmissible because it lacked an adequate foundation. Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Like Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange,
the court of appeals employed Rule 703 to assess the bases for an expert’s opinion: “Thus, the question 
for us is not whether there was some evidence, but whether, in terms of ‘the actual quantum and quality 
of proof necessary to support liability,’ there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could properly 
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which used Rules 702 and 703 to restrict the admissibility of expert 
testimony.20
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Daubert opinion, however, the method of 
analysis courts employed when ruling on admissibility remained in flux. 
Some courts focused their analysis on Rule 703.21 Others focused on Rule 
702.22 Still others created an admissibility rule that was an amalgam of both 
rules and the Frye test.23 Regardless of the rationale, in many of these cases 
expert opinions were excluded perhaps due to the growing conviction that 
without some judicial policing adversarial expert witnessing was out of 
control.24
Only one court relied purely on the old Frye test to exclude an expert.
That court was the Ninth Circuit in Daubert.25
                                                                                                                         
base a verdict for the Richardsons. . . . We conclude that Dr. Done’s opinion lacks an adequate basis and 
therefore, whether viewed alone or in conjunction with those of the other experts, did not provide the 
‘substantial probative evidence’ that would require us to leave the verdict as the jury rendered it.” Id. at 
828–29 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
Two other courts relied on sufficiency of the evidence to decide as a matter of law for Bendectin’s 
manufacturer. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
“[t]his case, we believe, should be decided on the rules of the sufficiency of evidence of causation on 
summary judgment”); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (discussing 
various scientific and statistical methods in regard to a sufficiency of evidence standard).
20 See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances 
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 643 (1992) 
(explaining the impact of the Agent Orange and Bendectin litigations in raising concerns about expert 
testimony and fueling more restrictive rules about their admisssibility). These two litigations were not 
alone. Christophersen involved exposure to fumes created in the process of manufacturing batteries that 
allegedly caused the plaintiff’s decedent’s colon cancer. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 
939 F.2d 1106, 1108. In Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 421–22 (5th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff 
claimed that exposure to a pesticide caused a number of ailments. 
21 Both Agent Orange and Richardson used Rule 703 to exclude the expert testimony. At the time, 
the language of Rule 703 was:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703. After Daubert, Rule 703 was relegated to the sidelines. One might speculate about 
whether the course of expert admissibility law would have run smoother had the Supreme Court relied 
on this rule rather than Rule 702.
22 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1990). 
23 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110.
24 Peter W. Huber, if not single-handedly responsible for concerns about the quality of expert 
testimony, surely beat the loudest drum on this subject. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
25 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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B. Daubert
The trial court opinion, quoting an earlier Ninth Circuit criminal law 
opinion,26 stated, “[a] necessary predicate to the admission of scientific 
evidence is that the principle upon which it is based ‘must be sufficiently 
established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.’”27
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals picked up on the general acceptance 
language and wrote a brief opinion that relied on Frye.28 The Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve whether the 
Frye general acceptance standard survived the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.29
As is well known, the Supreme Court answered in the negative.30 Instead 
of adopting Frye or relying on Rule 703, which addresses the legitimate 
bases on which an expert may base an opinion,31 the Daubert Court 
grounded its opinion in Rule 702, which refers to experts with “scientific . . 
. knowledge.”32 Scientific knowledge, the Court explained, is premised on 
reliable reasoning and methodology. This is an important point. At least 
since the Frye test, it is not sufficient that expert testimony be relevant.
It must also be reliable.33 The Court offered four non-exclusive factors 
courts might consider in resolving the issue of reliability: (1) peer review 
and publication; (2) the known or potential rate of error; (3) general 
acceptance; and (4) whether a theory has been tested (“falsification”).34
The four non-exclusive factors notwithstanding, the Court offered little 
by way of defining the key concept of reliability except to note that it is to 
be measured by more than the Frye test, and that in the toxic tort context 
where the question is one of scientific expertise, evidentiary reliability is to 
                                                                                                                         
26 United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978).
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d,
951 F.2d 1128, 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993).
28 Focusing on the epidemiologic record for Bendectin, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ 
experts, who relied on reanalyzing the published studies and found a sufficient association to support an 
opinion that causation existed, had not employed a proper methodology. The plaintiffs’ reanalysis of 
epidemiologic studies fell short because of a lack of peer review and publication. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 
1130–31. With all of their experts’ opinions excluded, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate causation; 
therefore, summary judgment was affirmed. Id. at 1131. 
29 Absent the Frye question, it seems unlikely the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari. 
The Court had refused to grant certiorari in several earlier Bendectin cases and refused to review two 
other courts of appeals decisions after granting certiorari in Daubert. The Court’s opinion demonstrated 
no interest in the specifics of the evidence on the causation issue involved in the Daubert case. See Green, 
supra note 17, at 309.
30 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
31 See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert 
has been made aware of or personally observed.”).
32 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. 
33 Id. at 584. 
34 Id. at 593–94.
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be understood as scientific validity.35 Importantly, the opinion did not offer 
a yardstick for assessing the quantum of reliability necessary to pass Daubert
muster.
In the first years after Daubert, courts frequently focused on the 
so-called Daubert factors when making admissibility determinations.36
However, another idea ultimately turned out to be more important. That idea 
was “fit.” Here is what the Supreme Court said about this concept:
Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony “assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue.” This condition goes primarily to relevance. 
“Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the 
case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” 
3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[02], p. 702–18. See also 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (CA3 1985) 
(“An additional consideration under Rule 702—and another 
aspect of relevancy—is whether expert testimony proffered in 
the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will 
aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”). The consideration 
has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of “fit.” “Fit” 
is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose 
is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated 
purposes. . . . The study of the phases of the moon, for 
example, may provide valid scientific “knowledge” about 
whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in 
issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However 
(absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence 
that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier 
of fact in determining whether an individual was unusually 
likely to have behaved irrationally on that night. Rule 702’s
“helpfulness” standard requires a valid scientific connection to 
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.37
In hindsight, the Daubert fit discussion is confused and confusing. In 
the first part of this paragraph, the Daubert Court seems to relegate fit to a 
question of relevance. Does the assertion of the expert have any bearing on 
the issues in the case? However, the Court opens the door to a different 
                                                                                                                         
35 Id. at 590–91; see Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts 
After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1396 (1994).
36 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“This case requires us 
to decide how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists.”); 
Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Procedurally, Daubert instructs us 
that the district court must determine admissibility under Rule 702 . . . .”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable under the 
Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”).
37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92.
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understanding when it cites Judge Becker’s Downing opinion and offers up 
its phases-of-the-moon example. It is, to be sure, a poor example, all too 
easily dismissed as silliness. But lurking in the example is an important 
point: Why is it that an expert should not discuss the phases of the moon 
when the issue is a party’s irrational behavior? Not presumably purely 
because it is irrelevant, for one must assume that the court imagines an expert 
who is prepared to say, “My opinion is that a full moon causes some people 
to behave irrationally and in my expert opinion, this person is such an 
individual.” The problem with this testimony, as the Court points out, is not 
that it is irrelevant. The problem is the absence of “creditable grounds 
supporting such a link [between phases of the moon and irrational 
behavior].”38 The problem is one of reliability,39 a problem that is pervasive 
in the realm of expert opinions on causation in toxic tort cases.
After Daubert, the concept of fit was rarely the centerpiece of 
admissibility decisions. This was so for two reasons. First, because on its 
face the passage seems to relegate “fit” to a question of relevance and it did 
not seem to be on point when the question was one of reliability. Rarely will 
an expert whose opinion is irrelevant to the issues at hand be called to testify. 
And Rule 401 is fully capable of dealing with that scarce expert.40
Second, the usefulness of the idea was seriously limited by the Daubert 
opinion’s incautious and ill-advised statement that:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a 
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity 
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the 
principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of 
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on 
the conclusions that they generate.41
                                                                                                                         
38 Id.
39 This idea is reinforced in another sentence in the opinion: “Proposed testimony must be supported 
by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” Id. at 590. One could say 
about the expert who claims that the full moon caused an individual to be irrational that the expert lacked 
good grounds for this position.
40 FED. R. EVID. 401.
41 Id. at 594–95.
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If “fit” has nothing to do with conclusions, it is not entirely clear what 
role it might play.42 Fortunately, the Court was quick to retreat from this 
position in Joiner, to which we now turn.43
C. Joiner
The next Supreme Court expert admissibility decision was General 
Electric v. Joiner.44 The Court took the Joiner case to resolve a conflict in 
the circuits about the proper level of appellate review of district court 
admissibility decisions.45 In Joiner, the Court concluded that the same 
“abuse of discretion” standard should be employed by appellate courts 
regardless of whether the trial court admitted or excluded expert testimony.46
However, for our purposes the import of the opinion lies elsewhere. 
Borrowing from the Turpin opinion, the Court revisited the statement in 
Daubert that drew a bright line between methodology and conclusions. 
Respondent points to Daubert’s language that the “focus, of 
course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on 
the conclusions that they generate.” 509 U.S., at 595. He 
claims that because the District Court’s disagreement was with 
the conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the 
District Court committed legal error and was properly reversed 
by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and methodology are 
                                                                                                                         
42 In the period between Daubert and Joiner, courts struggled with the relationship between 
admissibility and sufficiency while at the same time they were sorting out the role of “fit” in an 
admissibility ruling and what to make of Daubert’s assertion that admissibility rules only apply to 
methods, not conclusions. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation is the most valuable post-Daubert
opinion on all of these issues. Most of Judge Becker’s analysis was subsequently adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Joiner. However, even the Paoli opinion sent mixed messages about the relationship between 
sufficiency and admissibility. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(requiring “good grounds” for extrapolating animal toxicology studies to support an opinion about human 
causation while comparing concerns about the admissibility of novel scientific evidence with those for 
the admission of hearsay evidence).
43 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are not 
entirely distinct from one another.”). As we discuss below, although Joiner fundamentally retreated from 
the distinction between methodology and conclusions, courts desiring to admit expert testimony 
occasionally cite the Daubert passage unaccompanied by the Joiner reversal. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n
v. Khorrami, 2006 WL 5105271, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (explaining that a court must consider the 
scientific validity of an expert’s methodology, not the expert’s conclusion); Martinez v. Offshore 
Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 2011 WL 820313, at *2 (E.D. La. 2011) (explaining that the court’s analysis 
of the reliability of an expert’s testimony focuses on methodology, not conclusions).
44 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138–39 (1997).
45 Id.
46 “A court of appeals applying ‘abuse-of-discretion’ review to such rulings may not categorically 
distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings disallowing it. We likewise reject 
respondent’s argument that because the granting of summary judgment in this case was ‘outcome 
determinative,’ it should have been subjected to a more searching standard of review.” Id. at 142–43 
(citations omitted). 
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not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts 
commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in 
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may 
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered. See Turpin v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 
(CA6), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992). That is what the 
District Court did here, and we hold that it did not abuse its 
discretion in so doing.47
With this paragraph, the Court basically rejected the Daubert
method-conclusion distinction.48 Going forward, the key phrase in this 
passage turned out to be “too great an analytical gap.”49 The idea clearly is 
one of sufficiency in the sense that the court should inquire whether the 
scientific evidence available is sufficient to support the expert’s position.50
Note that from this point of view, the question of analytical gap always
necessitates consideration of the expert’s conclusion and the connection to 
the available scientific data. 
The Joiner opinion went beyond simply introducing the concept as a 
general proposition. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion discussed and 
critiqued animal studies and epidemiologic research cited by the plaintiff as 
supporting the position that exposure to PCBs either caused or “promoted”51
                                                                                                                         
47 Id. at 146.
48 As we note above, however, occasionally post-Joiner lower court opinions cite the Daubert
passage as a justification for admitting expert opinions. See supra text accompanying note 43.
49 Following is the language in Turpin to which the Joiner Court was referring: “[t]he analytical 
gap between the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn on the ultimate issue of human birth 
defects is too wide. Under such circumstances, a jury should not be asked to speculate on the issue of 
causation.” Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360–61 (6th Cir. 1992). A Westlaw 
search found a few opinions prior to Turpin employing the phrase “analytical gap,” but Turpin is the first 
opinion in which the phrase is used to refer to the gap between the evidence presented and the inference 
the expert draws from this evidence and proposes to testify about. 
50 As Susan Haack observed: “Justice Rehnquist’s ruling [in Joiner] pushes admissibility closer to 
sufficiency . . . .” Susan Haack, Mind the Analytical Gap! Tracing A Fault Line in Daubert, 61 WAYNE 
L. REV. 653, 677 (2016).
51 A cancer promoter is an agent that is not capable of inducing cellular mutagenesis but can either 
increase the capacity of another agent to induce mutagenesis or speed the cancer process along once 
mutagenesis has occurred. See Raymond Tennant, What Is a Tumor Promoter?, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 390–91 (1999). The National Cancer Institute web page provides a similar definition: “[a] process 
in which existing tumors are stimulated to grow. Tumor promoters are not able to cause tumors to form.” 
Tumor Promotion, NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE DICTIONARY OF CANCER TERMS,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=390316 [https://perma.cc/6JBG-
PXQL] (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
Something like this is what the Joiner expert had in mind. The promotion argument was introduced 
by one of the plaintiff’s experts who testified that: “[i]t [was] more likely than not, given Mr. Joiner’s
limited tobacco use, and also considering his second hand tobacco smoke exposure, and given his age at 
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the plaintiff’s lung cancer.52 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
epidemiology studies did not support the plaintiff’s position. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist ended by saying:
                                                                                                                         
the onset of lung cancer, 37 years, that tobacco smoke served only as the initiator of the cancer and that 
some other agent served as the promoter of the initiated cells. It was the promotion of the initiated cells 
which caused Mr. Joiner to be harmed.” Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 
(N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). But for the promotion 
effect of his PCB exposure, his cancer “would not have developed for many years, if at all.” Joiner,
522 U.S. at 139–40 (1997). “Accelerator” of the development of the disease may be a more accurate term 
than promoter. 
52 Following is the Court’s discussion of the animal and epidemiologic studies:
The District Court agreed with petitioners that the animal studies on which 
respondent’s experts relied did not support his contention that exposure to PCB's had 
contributed to his cancer. The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer 
after being exposed to PCB’s. The infant mice in the studies had had massive doses 
of PCB’s injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs. Joiner was an adult 
human being whose alleged exposure to PCB’s was far less than the exposure in the 
animal studies. The PCB’s were injected into the mice in a highly concentrated form. 
The fluid with which Joiner had come into contact generally had a much smaller PCB 
concentration of between 0-to-500 parts per million. The cancer that these mice 
developed was alveologenic adenomas; Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas. 
No study demonstrated that adult mice developed cancer after being exposed to 
PCB’s. One of the experts admitted that no study had demonstrated that PCB’s lead 
to cancer in any other species.
Respondent failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than explaining how and why the 
experts could have extrapolated their opinions from these seemingly far-removed 
animal studies, respondent chose “to proceed as if the only issue [was] whether animal 
studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion.” 864 F. Supp. at 1324. 
Of course, whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s
opinion was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were 
sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely. The 
studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts’ reliance on 
them.
The District Court also concluded that the four epidemiological studies on which 
respondent relied were not a sufficient basis for the experts’ opinions. The first such 
study involved workers at an Italian capacitor plant who had been exposed to PCB’s. 
Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori, Radice, & Zocchetti, Cancer Mortality of Capacitor 
Manufacturing Workers, 11 American Journal of Industrial Medicine 165 (1987). The 
authors noted that lung cancer deaths among ex-employees at the plant were higher 
than might have been expected, but concluded that “there were apparently no grounds 
for associating lung cancer deaths (although increased above expectations) and 
exposure in the plant.” Id., at 172. Given that Bertazzi et al. were unwilling to say that 
PCB exposure had caused cancer among the workers they examined, their study did 
not support the experts’ conclusion that Joiner’s exposure to PCB’s caused his cancer.
The second study followed employees who had worked at Monsanto’s PCB 
production plant. J. Zack & D. Musch, Mortality of PCB Workers at the Monsanto 
Plant in Sauget, Illinois (Dec. 14, 1979) (unpublished report), 3 Record, Doc. No. 11. 
The authors of this study found that the incidence of lung cancer deaths among these 
workers was somewhat higher than would ordinarily be expected. The increase, 
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We further hold that, because it was within the District Court’s
discretion “to conclude that the studies upon which the experts 
relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in 
combination, to support their conclusions” that Joiner’s
exposure to PCB’s contributed to his cancer, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony.53
D. Kumho Tire
The final case in the Daubert trilogy is Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.54
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kumho Tire to make it clear that 
the Daubert admissibility standard applied to all expert testimony.55
The plaintiffs in Kumho Tire were injured when the right rear tire on their 
minivan failed.56 Through a rather complex line of reasoning, the plaintiffs’
expert concluded that the tire failure occurred because of a manufacturing 
defect.57 Here is the gist of the expert’s argument: “[T]he tread of the tire at 
issue had separated from its inner steel-belted carcass prior to the 
                                                                                                                         
however, was not statistically significant and the authors of the study did not suggest 
a link between the increase in lung cancer deaths and the exposure to PCB’s.
The third and fourth studies were likewise of no help. The third involved workers at 
a Norwegian cable manufacturing company who had been exposed to mineral oil. 
Ronneberg, Andersen, & Skyberg, Mortality and Incidence of Cancer Among Oil 
Exposed Workers in a Norwegian Cable Manufacturing Company, 45 British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine 595 (1988). A statistically significant increase in lung cancer 
deaths had been observed in these workers. The study, however, (1) made no mention 
of PCB’s and (2) was expressly limited to the type of mineral oil involved in that 
study, and thus did not support these experts’ opinions. The fourth and final study 
involved a PCB-exposed group in Japan that had seen a statistically significant 
increase in lung cancer deaths. Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda, & Hirohata, Analysis of 
Deaths Seen Among Patients with Yusho—A Preliminary Report, 16 Chemosphere, 
Nos. 8/9, p. 2085 (1987). The subjects of this study, however, had been exposed to 
numerous potential carcinogens, including toxic rice oil that they had ingested. 
522 U.S. at 144–46 (footnotes omitted).
53 Id. at 146–47. We wish to make one additional observation about Joiner’s analytical gap. 
Recall, the analytical gap sentence reads in full: “A court may conclude that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. at 146. This should not be understood as 
a comment on a particular step in the reasoning of an expert; that is, the expert’s testimony is inadmissible 
only when the gap in one step of the argument is too large. It is the sum of the distance from the data to 
the conclusion, the total gap if you will, that needs to be minded in deciding whether the data sufficiently 
supports the conclusion for the latter to be admissible. See Neal C. Stout & Peter A. Valberg, Bayes’ Law, 
Sequential Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 
787 (2005).
54 526 U.S. 137 (1999); David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States,
44 JURIMETRICS 351, 354 (2004).
55 526 U.S. at 146–47. The Eleventh Circuit had held that it applied only to “scientific evidence.”
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435–36 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
56 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
57 Id. at 142–45.
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accident.”58 “[A] tire’s carcass should stay bound to the inner side of the 
tread for a significant period of time after its tread depth has worn away,”
which in fact had occurred on parts of the tire.59 The “separation” of carcass 
from tread caused the blowout.60 And what caused the separation? 
According to the plaintiffs’ expert, separation may be caused by a type of 
“tire misuse called ‘overdeflection’ (which consists of underinflating the tire 
or causing it to carry too much weight, thereby generating heat that can undo 
the chemical tread/carcass bond).”61 If the tire has not been subjected to this 
type of misuse, then the cause of a separation is a tire defect.62 Apparently 
the expert believed that no other possible causes needed to be considered.63
If a visual and tactile inspection of the tire reveals the tire has not been 
overdeflected, it must have been defective. 64
Without ever using the phrase “analytical gap,” Kumho Tire reinforced 
the Joiner approach65 and the “fit” language in Daubert.66
Admissibility analyses should focus on “the case at hand,” not on broad 
general principles and theories. That is, they should focus on the conclusions 
drawn by this expert and the evidence supporting these conclusions. 
In Kumho Tire, the Court confronted an expert with a novel and, according 
to the Court, unreliable67 way of assessing whether the failure was due to a 
manufacturing defect and who made fine distinctions about tread wear on 
the shoulder versus the center of the tire while at the same time being 
unwilling to make a determination whether the tire had gone 10, 20, 30, 40, 
                                                                                                                         
58 Id. at 144.
59 Id. at 143–44.
60 Id. at 144.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 In essence, the expert employed a methodology that courts call a “differential diagnosis” when 
performed by medical experts. E.g., Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260–61 
(6th Cir. 2001) (“One appropriate method for making a determination of causation for an individual 
instance of disease is known as ‘differential diagnosis,’ which is the method employed by Plaintiff’s 
experts in this case. . . . In making his differential diagnosis, i.e., ruling out other causes of Plaintiff’s 
CTS [carpal tunnel syndrome], Dr. Linz took an extensive history of Plaintiff’s non-occupational work 
activities.”). But, there is nothing specific to medicine or any particular discipline that is required to 
justify the logic that if all possible causes save one can be eliminated as a cause of an outcome of interest,
then the remaining potential cause is the actual one. Many different disciplines that seek causal 
explanations, including law enforcement, computer repair, and journalism, employ this reasoning. 
64 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 144, 154.
65 See supra pp. 10–11.
66 See supra pp. 8–9.
67 Here we mean to use the scientific meaning of “unreliable.” That is, the Court suggests that others 
looking at the same tire would be quite likely to come to a different conclusion. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at
157. In a scathing comment directed at the expert, the Court said: “Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson 
himself, were he still working for Michelin, would have concluded in a report to his employer that a 
similar tire was similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion 
here.” Id.
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or 50,000 miles prior to the accident.68 The Supreme Court concluded that 
the expert’s testimony was properly excluded, because although the general 
method he employed—a visual and tactile inspection of a tire—may be 
reliable in some situations, his application of the method on this occasion 
was not.69 The data upon which he based his conclusion, e.g., minute 
differences between wear on the inside shoulder and outside shoulder of the 
tire, were not sufficient to support his rejection of the “overdeflection” 
possibility.70
E. Revised Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Following these three cases, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee 
proposed revisions to Rule 702 to reflect the case law. The new rule now 
reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods 
to the facts of the case.71
For our purposes, the most important provision is (b), the requirement 
that “testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.”72 This, it seems to us, is 
at the heart of the Daubert revolution as reflected in Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho Tire. In our earlier paper, we discuss several opinions that seemingly 
adopt a sufficiency approach. Here is one very good example.
Judge Barbara Rothstein presided over the multi-district litigation 
proceedings involving the appetite suppressant phenylpropanolamine 
(PPA).73 As frequently occurs in these proceedings, she held Daubert
hearings to resolve expert admissibility issues prior to remanding the cases 
to the transferor courts where they would be tried.74 The plaintiffs claimed 
                                                                                                                         
68 Id. at 154–55.
69 Id. at 156–58.
70 Id. at 144–46, 158.
71 FED. R. EVID. 702.
72 Id.
73 In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
74 Id. at 1238.
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that the product caused hemorrhagic and ischemic strokes, as well as 
seizures.75 A comprehensive epidemiologic study of the relationship 
between PPA and hemorrhagic strokes in a limited demographic group had 
been conducted by researchers at Yale University.76
The plaintiffs offered the testimony of fourteen experts in 
pharmacology, epidemiology, neurology, toxicology, and pediatrics to 
testify to general causation, and the defendants challenged the admissibility 
of all fourteen.77 The defendants’ challenges related to the attributes of the 
plaintiffs (like gender and age), the time between ingestion of PPA and the 
relevant adverse event, and the types of injury suffered by the plaintiffs (for 
example, hemorrhagic strokes, ischemic strokes, and cardiac injuries).78
Judge Rothstein’s opinion systematically addressed each of these claims. 
After a rather thorough review of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
epidemiologic and non-epidemiologic research, the court concluded that 
although part of the Yale study was limited to women between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-nine, the plaintiffs’ experts would be permitted to 
extrapolate to older and younger individuals and to men.79 In the process, 
the court explained why these were reasonable inferences to draw.
It concluded, however, that the plaintiffs’ experts could not testify that 
events occurring more than three days after ingesting PPA were causally 
related to the drug.80 The most “difficult question” involved the type of 
injury suffered by the plaintiffs.81 The court concluded that the plaintiffs’
experts could testify to a causal relationship between PPA and hemorrhagic 
stroke.82 The scientific evidence with respect to ischemic strokes was a much 
closer call.83 Ischemic stroke had not been investigated in the Yale study,84
and one senses that this decision could easily have gone either way. In the 
end, the court concluded that experts could testify about a PPA-ischemic 
stroke association.85 On the other hand, the court ruled that the evidence 
linking PPA and other cardiac injuries was too attenuated to permit the 
plaintiffs’ experts to testify to this relationship.86
As we noted in our earlier article, what is most notable about this opinion 
is that it canvassed the scientific literature to determine which asserted 
                                                                                                                         
75 Id. at 1236. 
76 Id. at 1235.
77 Id. at 1236.
78 Id. at 1238, 1244, 1246, 1249.
79 Id. at 1235, 1239–41, 1244.
80 Id. at 1251.
81 Id. at 1249.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 1246 (“[I]n comparison to hemorrhagic stroke, plaintiffs’ experts on ischemic stroke 
unquestionably rely on a smaller volume of evidence directly relating to PPA.”). 
84 Id. at 1235.
85 Id. at 1251.
86 Id. at 1250–51.
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causal relationships were sufficiently supported by the scientific evidence 
and which were not. Moreover, the court reached its conclusions without 
reference to the work or methods of any of the fourteen experts proffered by 
the plaintiffs; rather, the court determined which causal inferences could 
reasonably be drawn from the scientific evidence, and sanctioned expert 
testimony, presumably by any qualified expert, on those matters.87
II. CRITIQUES OF OUR ARGUMENT
The argument we advanced in the earlier paper generated two types of 
criticisms: a normative criticism that our proposal fundamentally alters the 
probability that testimony will be admitted; and an empirical criticism that, 
notwithstanding our proffering a number of cases like In re
Phenylpropanolamine, in point of fact, many courts routinely make 
admissibility rulings without the use of any type of sufficiency analysis. 
In essence, the criticism is similar to that for case reports: we employed a 
numerator without providing a denominator.
A. The Normative Critique: Altering the probability of admissibility.
The first critique is that our proposed approach will inappropriately 
reduce the probability that testimony will be admitted. This position was 
expressed by Professor Aaron Twerski and his co-author Lior Sapir.88
They argued that adoption of a sufficiency test is inappropriate because it is 
too liberal.89 They arrive at this position by comparing their understanding 
of the standard for admissibility, which they claim is a requirement that the 
court “must have a high degree of confidence in the integrity of scientific 
evidence before it qualifies for consideration”90—the test used when a party 
moves for  summary judgment, which requires that all reasonable inferences 
from the evidence must be drawn in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party before deciding whether the evidence is sufficient for 
submission to the jury.91
As we noted in our response to their critique, the nub of our 
disagreement is their claim that weak and frivolous toxic tort cases must be 
screened by judges because of the high costs of false positives in such 
cases.92 We find no warrant in Daubert, its progeny, or Rule 702 (none of 
                                                                                                                         
87 Id. at 1246–51. 
88 See Aaron D. Twerski & Lior Sapir, Sufficiency of the Evidence Does Not Meet Daubert
Standards: A Critique of the Green-Sanders Proposal, 23 WIDENER L.J. 641, 642, 660–61 (2014) 
(arguing that our approach is “simply wrong” and will “loosen[] . . . the standards of admissibility”).
89 Id. at 648–651.
90 Id. at 650.
91 Id. at 649. 
92 We have previously responded to the Twerski/Sapir critique in detail. Michael D. Green & Joseph 
Sanders, In Defense of Sufficiency: A Reply to Professor Twerski and Mr. Sapir, 23 WIDENER L.J. 663, 
666 (2014).
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which are limited to toxic tort cases) for changing the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in toxic tort cases. 
That preponderance test reflects a norm that errors on behalf of plaintiffs are 
equally costly as errors for defendants, and thus the civil standard of proof 
does not tilt in either party’s direction, unlike criminal cases. Moreover, as 
we demonstrate in the next Part, a sufficiency approach does not lessen the 
probability that testimony will be admitted.
Some courts and commentators are concerned about the opposite 
outcome. They believe the standard for admissibility of evidence is, or 
should be, lower than the standard used to assess sufficiency, and thus courts 
err when they engage in any type of sufficiency analysis when making a 
Daubert decision.93
We believe that the latter concern misses an important distinction. The 
distinction is between what might be called local sufficiency and global 
sufficiency, or, as some courts describe the issue, sufficiency of the basis 
versus sufficiency of the evidence.94 We admit to not having been clear on 
this point in our earlier article, but when we discuss sufficiency in the context 
of admitting expert opinions, we are talking about local sufficiency. For 
example, the question of sufficiency surrounding the expert’s proffered 
causal testimony, which of course is a different question from the question 
of whether the entire body of evidence bearing on causation, from both the 
plaintiff and the defendant, warrants summary judgment on sufficiency 
grounds.95
                                                                                                                         
93 See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 564–65 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that courts should avoid “the confusion and conflation of admissibility issues with issues 
regarding the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to survive summary judgment”); Lucinda M. Finley, 
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to 
Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 337 (1999) (“By calling what is really a 
sufficiency of the evidence determination an admissibility decision, judges are using their evidentiary 
gatekeeper power to close the gate on plaintiffs’ opportunities to have their proof evaluated as a 
cumulative whole.”); Haack, supra note 50 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), pushed the admissibility standard closer to sufficiency); 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Daubert Revisited: Disturbing Implications, 22 CHAMPION 18, 20 (May 1998) 
(“Shortly after the rendition of the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision, one perceptive commentator 
voiced the fear that in applying Daubert, the lower courts would improperly conflate the standards for 
admissibility and legal sufficiency. That fear seems to have been realized.”).
94 McBride v. Houston Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1:12CV1047-MHT, 2015 WL 3648995, at *2 
(M.D. Ala. June 11, 2015).
95 Perhaps our lack of clarity on this point caused some to conclude that we meant to conflate 
admissibility and global sufficiency decisions. Haack, supra note 50, at 680. In this regard, we should 
make one more point. Occasionally there is a lack of clarity on the consequences of a finding of 
sufficiency. A finding of either global or local sufficiency is not an ultimate finding of fact. Rather, it is 
a finding that the proof would permit a jury or other fact finder to find in the party’s favor. Sometimes 
this important distinction is overlooked in articles addressing the admissibility-sufficiency issue. 
Id. at 680, 685; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Second Prong of the Daubert Test: Disturbing 
Implications of Two Recent Civil Cases, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 570, 575 (1997) (stating that “standing alone 
purported scientific testimony must possess sufficient probative value to prove the fact in issue”).
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These two sufficiency questions become one in cases in which the court 
excludes all testimony from the plaintiff’s causation expert(s). Once that 
happens, there is no evidence to support a finding of causation and thus, 
summary judgment on global sufficiency grounds will inevitably follow. 
The local sufficiency and global sufficiency collapse into a single 
determination. 
A particularly useful case illustrating the relationship between local and 
global sufficiency is In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrocloride) Products 
Liability Litigation.96 The issue in the case was the admissibility of the 
plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony on two separate questions. The first was 
whether in vitro and in vivo research permitted them to reach the conclusion 
that there was a plausible biological mechanism by which the antidepressant 
altered embryonic development.97 The second was whether the 
antidepressant, used at prescribed doses, could cause human birth defects.98
After a review of the data, the court concluded that with one exception it 
“[would] not exclude the opinions of these experts to the extent that they 
opine as to plausible biological mechanisms of injury.”99 But the court 
reached a different conclusion with respect to their opinion on human 
causation. Among other things, it focused on the fact that the experts had 
little to say about existing epidemiologic evidence that generally failed to 
find an association between use of the drug and birth defects:
Where [epidemiologic] research does not support the 
conclusions drawn by the experts, the experts must endeavor 
to reconcile the inconsistent epidemiological data with their 
opinions. Here, the experts have given scant attention to the 
epidemiology research in their reports, and have failed to 
reconcile inconsistent epidemiological evidence with their 
opinions on human causation. . . . The experts’ failure to 
reconcile inconsistent epidemiological research with their 
                                                                                                                         
96 In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 466, 481 
(E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 858 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2017).
97 Id. at 468.
98 For example, the court reported about one expert: 
Dr. Cabrera opines that serotonin is an important signaling molecule for organ 
development in a developing embryo, regulating “cell proliferation, migration, 
differentiation, and gene expression . . . processes [ ] fundamental to creating a 
normally formed embryo.” He further opines that SSRI exposure “alters normal 
serotonin signaling pathways,” and that “[t]here exists a biologically plausible 
mechanism of teratogenic action (MOA) . . . [A]lteration of serotonin signaling by 
SSRIs, including sertraline, can impact embryonic development resulting in several 
different congenital malformations, involving various body and organ systems. . . .” 
Thus SSRIs, including Zoloft, are “capable of causing birth defects.”
Id. at 469 (footnotes omitted).
99 Id. at 473.
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opinions regarding human causation is a significant 
methodological flaw, undermining their reliability under 
Daubert. . . . Because of the current state of the science, 
Drs. Sadler, Cabrera, and Levin’s opinions about human 
causation require speculative leaps which are unacceptable in 
science and in the courthouse; their opinions about human 
causation are therefore inadmissible under Daubert.100
The court did not stop there, however. It added the following 
observation in response to the defendant’s request that all of the plaintiffs’ 
experts’ testimony be excluded:
Pfizer argues that the testimony of Drs. Sadler, Cabrera and 
Levin should be excluded in its entirety because the experts’
opinions on human causation do not meet the Daubert
standard. However, this argument conflates the sufficiency of 
the evidence with the admissibility of the testimony. The 
experts at issue here have conducted and reviewed in vitro and 
in vivo research which they believe demonstrates the existence 
of one or more plausible biological mechanisms by which 
altered concentrations of serotonin in a developing embryo 
may cause birth defects. The Court finds that the methodology 
these experts used to reach their conclusions about biological 
plausibility is generally reliable, and will not exclude their 
opinions regarding biological mechanisms, if they are 
otherwise admissible . . . .101
At first reading, this passage seems to distinguish admissibility from 
sufficiency, but a closer reading reveals that the distinction the court is 
drawing is one between local and global sufficiency.  The court accepted the 
biological plausibility opinions because they are supported by sufficient data 
and rejected the human causation opinions because they are not. Each of 
these determinations focuses on the sufficiency of the data available to 
support the conclusion the expert wishes to draw.102
We think the Zoloft opinion got it just right. The court ruled on the 
admissibility of the general causation experts based on the evidence they 
proffered to support their general causation assertion. However, there was 
other admissible evidence in support of causation, so the inadmissibility of 
the general causation experts did not conclusively resolve the matter of 
                                                                                                                         
100 Id. at 476–77, 481 (footnotes omitted).
101 Id. at 481.
102 For a similar analysis, see In re Lipitor Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 3d 911 (D.S.C. 2016) 
(holding that the expert’s opinion that doses of 80 milligrams per day of drug could cause Type-2 diabetes 
was based on sufficient scientific facts and data, but his opinion that ten milligrams per day caused Type-
2 diabetes was not).
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global sufficiency in Zoloft. Global sufficiency required attention to the stray
evidence that the plaintiffs proffered outside that had been relied on by their 
general causation experts.103
Two years later, after ruling that another general causation expert’s 
testimony was inadmissible (in our language, not locally sufficient), the 
court addressed the sufficiency of the totality of the admitted evidence of 
biological plausibility, case reports, and other materials submitted by the
plaintiffs and concluded: “Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient admissible 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Zoloft could have caused Plaintiffs’ 
injuries.”104 Based on this global sufficiency judgment, it granted summary 
judgment for the defendant.105
                                                                                                                         
103 Parenthetically, we note that we expect that circumstance—supportive evidence of causation 
that is not relied on by general (or specific) causation expert witnesses—is rare. 
104 In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 3d 483, 499 
(E.D. Pa. 2016).
105 Id. at 499, 500. Susan Haack seems to fail to recognize what Judge Rufe did here—that even if 
there is admissible evidence, a global sufficiency determination may also be required. Haack, supra note 
50, at 682.
The failure to distinguish global and local sufficiency helps to explain confusion others have 
expressed about the admissibility-sufficiency distinction. For example, shortly after Daubert was 
decided, Thomas J. Mack wondered how expert testimony admitted under the new rule could fail to be 
sufficient. He believed that Daubert “carries the seemingly contradictory assumption that scientific 
testimony can be admissible as relevant and reliably grounded in scientifically valid reasoning and 
methodology and also be so ‘shaky’ that it is insufficient to establish what it asserts.” Thomas J. Mack, 
Scientific Testimony After Daubert: Some Early Returns from Lower Courts, 30 TRIAL 23, 30 (1994). 
Our answer to this question is clear. It couldn’t if, by the phrase “what it asserts,” we mean the conclusion 
drawn by the expert. This, of course, does not preclude a global sufficiency judgment based on the totality 
of the evidence where the expert’s opinion does not address the ultimate issue.  
Professor Imwinkelried’s sufficiency-admissibility argument also suffers from conflating local and 
global sufficiency. For example, in his comments concerning Daubert II—the opinion in which Judge 
Kozinski refused to send the case back to the trial court and ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiffs 
had insufficient evidence to prevail because the epidemiological evidence did not indicate a relative risk 
of 2.0 or greater—Professor Imwinkelried noted that the epidemiology evidence was not the only 
causation testimony. Toxicology experts also testified that Bendectin was a teratogen based on animal 
studies and chemical structure similarities with other, known teratogens. He seems to conclude that an 
insufficiency judgment is rarely, if ever, appropriate: “When the various experts vouch for several 
different types of evidence pointing to a connection, it seems arbitrary to rule that it would be irrational 
for the jurors to find a connection.” Imwinkelried, supra note 93, at 25.
Surely, however, the question of global sufficiency is not to be determined by how many “pieces” 
of evidence exist regardless of the probative value of the sum of the pieces. To see that this is the case, 
assume that none of the expert witnesses testifying on the findings of animal study and chemical structure 
research had opined as to the ultimate question of whether Bendectin caused the Daubert injury. They 
simply reported the findings of these investigations. Their testimony might well be admitted under a local 
sufficiency test. That is, the studies do support their testimony, and their statements are relevant as 
making the issue of causation more likely to exist. This does not mean that when asked to rule on a global 
sufficiency motion, a judge is required to accept this admitted testimony as sufficient to prove Bendectin 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, contrary to the implication of the Imwinkelried quotation, the 
sufficiency standard is not that finding against the non-moving party would be irrational. Rather, it is that 
it would require impermissible speculation rather than a reasonable inference.
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Normally, once a causation expert’s testimony on an ultimate issue is 
admitted, that is sufficient for the jury to find for a party on that issue. If, for 
example, a judge admits the testimony of an expert who proposes to testify 
that a substance causes the type of injury from which the plaintiff suffers 
and also rules admissible the testimony of a specific causation expert, local 
and global sufficiency collapse and the judge should rule against a motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence on causation.
However, the subsequent grant of summary judgment in the Zoloft case 
reveals that this may not always be the case. We pointed out this possibility 
when discussing global sufficiency in our earlier article. The success of a 
summary judgment sufficiency motion turns not only on the evidence 
presented by the party against whom the motion is directed, but also on the 
evidence presented by the moving party. Our example of this situation came 
from O’Connor v. Pennsylvania Railroad.106 In that case, the plaintiff 
slipped on ice at the entrance of the defendant’s station. The issue was how 
long the ice had been there and, therefore, whether the defendant had been 
negligent in failing to remove it. The plaintiff testified that he slipped on 
dirty, grey ice, not fresh snow. Uncontroverted, this would be sufficient to 
submit to a jury the question of the defendant’s notice and unreasonable 
delay in addressing the hazard, just as an expert’s testimony that causation 
exists would be sufficient. However, the defendant introduced evidence 
from the United States Weather Bureau that virtually ruled out the possibility 
that any snow and ice remained from a prior storm. The court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.107
A similar situation arises with some frequency with respect to expert 
admissibility rulings. In the toxic tort arena, perhaps the best example comes 
from the many opinions that exclude causation testimony based on case 
reports, chemical structural similarity, and in vitro and/or animal studies 
when there exists a substantial body of epidemiologic evidence tending to 
show that the agent does not cause the disease in question.
Among the many cases expressing this position is a silicone-gel implant 
case, Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.108 There, the court made the 
following pronouncement:
                                                                                                                         
In Daubert II, Judge Kozinski acted similarly with respect to the epidemiologic evidence. 
He ruled that because this evidence and all of the other evidence presented by the plaintiffs was 
insufficient to support a specific causation conclusion, it was inadmissible. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 (9th Cir. 1995).
106 308 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1962).
107 Id. at 912. See also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005) (“[I]f an expert’s 
opinion is based on certain assumptions about the facts, we cannot disregard evidence [submitted by the 
moving party] showing those assumptions were unfounded.”).
108 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence regarding animal studies was not sufficient to allow a rational jury 
to find that the drug in question led to plaintiff’s birth defects); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 
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This is not a case where there is no epidemiology. It is a case 
where the body of epidemiology largely finds no association 
between silicone breast implants and immune system diseases. 
We are not holding that epidemiological studies are always 
necessary in a toxic tort case. We are simply holding that 
where there is a large body of contrary epidemiological 
evidence, it is necessary to at least address it with evidence 
that is based on medically reliable and scientifically valid 
methodology.109
One may usefully compare this statement with the following statement 
in In re Heparin Products Liability Litigation:110
Courts have rejected non-epidemiological evidence as 
unreliable where there is an overwhelming body of 
epidemiological evidence to the contrary. . . . Here, however, 
there is no such overwhelming body of contrary 
epidemiological evidence. Defendants point to two 
epidemiological studies, neither of which were designed to 
determine whether there was an association between 
contaminated heparin and any of the conditions identified in 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Absence of proof 
is not proof of absence, and while these studies do not provide 
                                                                                                                         
953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (holding that, everything considered, there was not enough evidence to 
show that the child’s exposure to the drug in question caused his birth defect).
109 Norris, 397 F.3d at 882; see also Rimbert v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. CIV 06-0874 JCH/LFG, 
2009 WL 2208570, at *13 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009) (“Dr. Jackson’s report does not contain any citation 
to any controlled clinical trial or other epidemiological study which demonstrates that the ingestion of 
Prozac creates an increased risk or an increased incidence of the following conditions: akathisia, suicidal 
thinking, suicidal behavior or completed suicide, violence or homicidal behavior, worsening depression, 
psychotic decompensation, psychiatric rage, impulsivity or impulsive behavior, or disinhibition or 
diminished capacity to resist engaging in homicidal or suicidal behavior. . . . Even more damaging to 
Dr. Jackson’s reliability than her lack of reliance on epidemiological studies to generate and support her 
conclusions is her failure to grapple with any of the myriad epidemiological studies that refute her 
conclusion. At the time she wrote her report, Dr. Jackson was aware of a body of published medical and 
scientific literature, including controlled clinical trials and other epidemiological studies, which supports 
the proposition that Prozac is not associated with suicidality, but she did not consider that literature in 
the formation of her opinions and report in this case.”); Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 
440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“Dr. Geier’s conclusion that the peer-reviewed literature he 
has relied upon supports his theory that autism can be caused by thimerosal is flatly contradicted by all 
of the epidemiological studies available at this time.”); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1122
(N.Y. 2006) (“Key to this litigation is the relationship, if any, between exposure to gasoline containing 
benzene as a component and AML. Landrigan fails to make this connection perhaps because, as 
defendants claim, no significant association has been found between gasoline exposure and AML. 
Plaintiff's experts were unable to identify a single epidemiologic study finding an increased risk of AML 
as a result of exposure to gasoline.”). For a discussion of the Parker case, see Dwight A. Kern & Robert 
J. Kenney, Jr., Frye Meets Parker and the Effect on Toxic Exposure Cases, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 27–29 
(2007).
110 803 F. Supp. 2d 712 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
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support for plaintiffs’ theories, neither do they contradict 
them. I will not, therefore, exclude plaintiffs’ evidence on 
these grounds.111
Of course, there remains the question of whether a particular court in a 
particular case will or will not conclude there is insufficient support for a 
conclusion the expert wishes to draw. This is what we were referring to in 
our earlier paper when we said that inevitably, in close cases, courts may 
come to contrary conclusions as to whether some evidence is admissible.112
This, however, is not an attribute of thinking about admissibility in 
sufficiency terms. Rather, as the Restatement (Third) of Torts notes, it is 
because “the line between reasonable inference and prohibited speculation 
is one of the more indistinct lines that exists in law.”113 We hope that a
straightforward acknowledgment that courts are making local sufficiency 
judgments when they rule on expert admissibility will, if anything, reduce 
the variance in such decisions. 
Interestingly, one of us has had an opportunity to discuss the In re
Phenlypropanolomine (PPA) and In re Zoloft opinions with the judges who
authored them. Both judges initially denied that they had employed a 
sufficiency standard in deciding the Daubert motion. When pressed, they 
suggested they were informed by assessing the reliability of the expert 
witness’s testimony based on the Daubert factors—much closer to an 
admissibility than a sufficiency standard. Yet, upon being pointed to the 
sufficiency aspect of their opinions, both acknowledged that they had used 
sufficiency language in their opinions. We take from this that, often, even 
judges who use a sufficiency approach are unaware of it, and that a survey 
of judges to determine their views on the proper methodology for deciding 
expert admissibility could, unless cleverly constructed, be seriously biased
by this cognitive dissonance.
B. The Empirical Critique: Many courts reject the application of any type 
of sufficiency analysis to admissibility decisions.
The second critique of our earlier paper is, from one perspective, more 
fundamental. It is that we cherry-picked our cases without fairly accounting 
for cases that reject an admissibility approach that relies on sufficiency.114
In assessing what courts do in their Daubert determinations, it is only fair to 
                                                                                                                         
111 Id. at 727–28. As an aside, one point to note about these opinions is that, like global sufficiency, 
local sufficiency is not a decision to be made entirely within the four corners of an individual witness 
opinion. In cases such as Norris, the court has compared an expert’s proffered testimony to that of her 
counterparts on the other side to assess the total evidence available with respect to a particular conclusion. 
112 Green & Sanders, supra note 4, at 1092–93.
113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 28 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
114 See Haack, supra note 50, at 680 (critiquing the authors’ approach to case selection).
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observe that there is conflict and confusion in the cases which, of course,
was part of the motivation for writing the first paper.  
In the next Part, we discuss our initial efforts to assess when courts do 
and do not account for sufficiency in Daubert challenges to expert testimony 
on causation. We hope that this discussion will not only lead to a better 
understanding of what courts are doing, but that it will also address the first 
critique—that adopting a sufficiency approach systematically alters 
admissibility outcomes.
III. COUNTING AND ASSESSING CASES
A. Case Selection and Data Coding
As have others before us, we concluded that the best way to get a handle 
on the issue of when courts do and do not employ a sufficiency analysis 
when assessing admissibility was to look at a group of cases drawn from a 
legal database: in our case, Westlaw.115
                                                                                                                         
115 This study follows in the footsteps of a number of other studies that have used legal databases 
to study the effect of Daubert on judicial decision making. They include LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL,
CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE
DAUBERT DECISION (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2001); Jennifer L Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert 
on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 339 (2002); Mark Haug & Emily Baird, Finding the Error in Daubert, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 737 (2011); 
Andrew Jurs, Gatekeeper with a Gavel: A Survey Evaluating Judicial Management of Challenges to 
Expert Reliability and Their Relationship to Summary Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 325 (2014); John B. 
Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges Use Error Rates in 
Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063 (2014). This research is in addition to another 
body of research that surveys judges to assess their knowledge and use of Daubert. See generally
Veronica B. Dahir et al., Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile 
Evidence: A Research Note, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 62 (2005); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking 
the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
The study that is perhaps most relevant to the present paper is that by Meixner and Diamond. In 
that study, they examined how judges assess the admissibility of expert opinion. They found that judges 
faced with a Daubert challenge often undertook a rather detailed assessment of the quality of the 
methodology employed by the expert. They did not, as some have suggested, rely on the peripheral 
Daubert factors of peer review and general acceptance. In conducting their assessment, judges focus 
most attention on what they call an “implicit error rate analysis” and to a somewhat lesser extent on the 
Daubert testability factor. 
From our reading of the Meixner and Diamond paper, we believe that what they label an implicit 
error-rate analysis is very similar to what we would label an analytical-gap analysis. Here, for example, 
are two passages they cite as examples of an implicit error rate analysis: 
The case reports upon which [the experts] rely make little attempt to isolate or exclude 
possible alternative causes, lack adequate controls, and lack any real analysis. 
Granted, an overwhelming amount of case reports of a temporal proximity between a 
very specific drug and a very specific adverse event might, as [the opposing expert] 
admits, be enough to make a general causation conclusion sufficiently reliable. In this 
case, however, we have a scant number of case reports indicating that Parlodel is 
temporally associated with all types of adverse events. There is not the volume of or 
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It is easy to say, “just count the cases,” but as anyone who has used a 
legal database as a source of data can attest, counting cases is more difficult 
than it first appears because of the difficulty of determining, inter alia, which 
cases to count. Searches tend to be either under-inclusive or over-inclusive. 
Because our focus in this and our earlier paper has been on the use of expert 
testimony to prove causation in toxic tort cases, we sought to choose a set of 
cases that reflect this focus. However, a simple search of cases in the 
“All State and Federal” database on Westlaw that uses the terms “Daubert” 
and “causation” returns over 10,000 cases, and, of course, a very large 
percentage are not on point. On the other hand, searching for the term “toxic 
tort” proved to be remarkably under-inclusive. Many toxic torts, especially 
those involving drug-induced injuries, do not use the term. We did discover, 
however, that most cases involving toxic torts do use one or both of two 
other phrases: “general causation” and “specific causation.”116 Our initial 
search of cases using the terms “Daubert” and “general causation” in the 
text of the opinion returned over 900 cases.117 We achieved a similar result 
with a search of “Daubert” and “specific causation.” Given this large 
number of cases, we decided to restrict the search further by including the 
                                                                                                                         
specificity within these case reports to reliably show that [the drug caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries].
Meixner & Diamond, supra, at 1117 (citing Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 
(S.D. Ill. 2001) (citation omitted));
Does an [adult’s] ability to appreciate wrongfulness only at the level of a child 
between 8 and 12 years of age make one insane? The court has found no authority for 
such a sweeping generalization. Courts have long allowed children as young as six 
years old to testify because “there is no precise age which determines the question of 
competency. This depends on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his 
appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to 
tell the former.”
. . . .
The analytical gap between tests which show “low normal” functioning and an 
immature thought process on one hand and a conclusion of insanity on the other is 
just too great. The gap between the evidence concerning Klinefelter Syndrome and a 
diagnosis of insanity is even greater. This factor weighs heavily against admission of 
the testimony.
Id. at 1117–18 (citing United States v. Eff, 461 F. Supp. 2d 529, 535 (E.D. Tex. 2006)).
116 Toxic tort cases employ both terms because the question of whether a substance causes injury is 
very often separated from the question of whether the substance caused the plaintiff’s injury.
See S.C. Gold et al., Epidemiologic Evidence in Toxic Torts, in FORENSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 25, 34–36 (Michael D. Freedman & Maurice P. Zeegers eds., 2016) (defining “general
causation” and “specific causation” in an epidemiological context).
117 The actual search was “OP(daubert & general /1 causation),” where the term “OP” restricts the 
search to the use of the terms in the opinion itself. All the searches discussed below were limited in this 
way. The phrase “general /1 causation” restricts the search to the use of the words next to each other.  
Although this search would also return cases which contained the phrase “causation general,” in fact we 
encountered no such cases.
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term “admissibility” into the search. These searches—one with the term 
“general causation” and one with the term “specific causation”—each
returned over 700 cases, although there was substantial overlap. 
We could have chosen to sample a subset of these cases, and perhaps we 
might do so in the future. In this initial effort, however, we decided to add 
one more term to our search. Because we are particularly interested in 
courts’ use of the concept of sufficiency, we added that term as well.118
A pair of searches were conducted in mid-April 2016. The search using the 
term “general causation” returned 165 opinions and the search using the term 
“specific causation” returned 168 opinions,119 some published and some 
appearing only on Westlaw. 
We read each of these cases to determine whether to include them in the 
final data set. A large percentage of cases were excluded for various reasons. 
First, we excluded all cases where the judge did not make an admissibility 
ruling.120 We also excluded all opinions that had been overruled, even when 
they were overruled on other grounds. Cases that did not employ a Daubert
standard of admissibility were also excluded. Most of these were state cases 
that explicitly employed a state version of the “Frye” standard. Finally, we 
excluded cases that did not address a question of general causation or 
specific causation in spite of the fact that they had used one of those terms. 
This meant we excluded cases in which the expert admissibility decision did 
not involve a question of causation, and cases that did not sound in tort, of 
which there were only one or two. We also excluded all but one of a group 
of cases if they were written by the same judge on the same legal issue in 
the same underlying case. This occurred when a group of cases were 
involved in a federal multi-district litigation (MDL), and the transferee judge 
made the same global causation-admissibility determination for multiple 
cases in multiple opinions.
These exclusions left us with eighty-six cases. Of those, seventy-three
employed the term “general causation,” and sixty-eight employed the term 
“specific causation.” For each case, we coded whether it was a state or a 
                                                                                                                         
118 This decision had the potential to eliminate some cases where expert testimony was excluded 
without a sufficiency analysis. However, without using this term, the search produced a large number of 
cases that were not on point, and the inclusion of the term allowed us to capture cases in which the courts 
explicitly say that an admissibility judgment is not a sufficiency judgment. 
119 The exact searches were: “OP(daubert & general /1 causation & admissibility & sufficiency)”
and “OP(daubert & specific /1 causation & admissibility & sufficiency).” As we discuss below, the great
majority of these cases employed both terms, so the overlap in the two sets of cases was substantial.
120 Many of these cases were not about admissibility. They included cases in which the judge chose 
to reserve admissibility determinations to later in the trial process, cases heard in the vaccine court in 
which the special master hears all the testimony, and cases in which the judge only addressed the question 
of global sufficiency. Finally, we excluded cases where there was an admissibility ruling but it was based 
solely on the qualifications of an expert witness.
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federal opinion, whether it involved what we call a “toxic tort,”121 whether 
it involved a prescription drug, and the year the case was decided. 
Most significantly, we coded whether the expert testimony had or had not 
been admitted, and whether the judge, in our opinion, had employed a 
sufficiency analysis.122
Coding admissibility was fairly straightforward. The codes were 
“admit,” “exclude,” or “both,” with one case coded “other.”123
Coding for sufficiency was a far more difficult task. We began by coding 
cases using the term “general causation” and coding general causation 
experts. We then looked to determine if there were specific causation experts 
for which the court made an independent admissibility determination. 
In general, this only occurred if the court admitted the testimony of at least 
one general causation expert. This is the case because almost all courts 
follow the rule that the plaintiff must “rule-in” the purported cause (thereby 
satisfying general causation) before “ruling-out” other causes, which is the 
task of the specific causation expert. If the court excluded the general 
causation expert, it often simply made a conclusory assertion that the 
specific causation testimony was also excluded. When the court admitted the 
testimony of a general causation expert, however, it needed to make an 
independent assessment of the admissibility of the specific causation 
witnesses. We looked at each of these determinations separately to see if our 
sufficiency code for these specific causation experts was different from the 
                                                                                                                         
121 The term “toxic tort” is subject to multiple definitions. We use the term for situations in which 
the plaintiff’s exposure allegedly led to a non-traumatic injury, i.e., a disease that involved some latency 
period. As we note below, this definition excluded some drug cases, but by and large we did retain a 
good proportion of drug cases in the data base.
122 As we note below, coding of this nature inevitably involves the exercise of judgment. We, like 
others who have coded cases in this way, have found that it is impossible to develop a rigid set of coding 
rules that cleanly sorts opinions. Our choice does create the risk of unconscious bias that could skew our 
results.
123 We coded a case as “both” if there were multiple causation experts, some of whom were allowed 
to testify, and some of whom were not. Cases were also coded “both” if some of an expert’s testimony 
was admitted and some excluded. The one case coded “other” was King v. Burlington Northern Santa 
Fe Railway Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009). It violated our rule of exclusion for all cases in which there 
was no admissibility decision. In King, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted a Daubert standard and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. This violated our general rule to exclude cases where there 
was no admissibility finding, but we included the case anyway because of its clear adoption of a 
sufficiency standard:
We recognize that a court’s wrestling with this type of evidence is no small task. On 
remand, however, the district court may conduct a Daubert/Schafersman hearing. It 
should resolve any questions that it has, or that BNSF raises, regarding the sufficiency
of the underlying studies or the reliability of Frank’s opinion testimony. But the court 
should remember that regarding the sufficiency of the underlying studies, it should 
focus on whether no reasonable expert would rely on the studies to find a causal 
relationship—not whether the parties dispute their force or validity.
King, 762 N.W.2d at 49.
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code we gave the general causation witness. If not, we gave the case a single 
code. If our code was different, we included the case a second time in the 
data base. This occurred only twice, producing a total of eighty-eight
observations.
Fourteen cases did not include the term “general causation” and we only 
coded the admissibility determination of the specific causation expert. 
In most of these cases, the court did not rule on a general causation expert. 
Several of these cases were remands to the transferor court from an MDL 
proceeding in which the MDL judge had already made general causation 
determinations.
Recall that our objective is to determine whether the judge admitted or 
excluded evidence based on a judgment that the evidence relied on by the 
expert was sufficient to support his or her opinion on causation. 
Coding “yes” on sufficiency was easiest in cases in which the court 
explicitly used the language of revised Rule 702, which requires that there 
be sufficient data to support the expert’s conclusion.124 In most cases, 
                                                                                                                         
124 For example, in McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., the court quoted United States v. W.R. Grace,
504 F.3d 745, 765 (9th Cir. 2007): “[E]valuation of an expert’s opinion testimony ‘requires consideration 
of the overall sufficiency of the underlying facts and data, and the reliability of the methods, as well as 
the fit of the methods to the facts of the case.’” 710 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1114 (D. Ore. 2010). And in 
Ashburn v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., the court stated: 
This matter clearly comes under [Rule] 702, which mandates that expert testimony 
must be based on sufficient underlying facts or data. The term “data” is intended to 
encompass the reliable opinions of other experts. The advisory note to Rule 702 is 
instructive: “Rule 702 sets forth the overarching requirement of reliability, and an 
analysis of the sufficiency of the expert’s basis cannot be divorced from the ultimate 
reliability of the expert’s opinion.”
No. 3:06-CV-2367, 2007 WL 4225493, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2007) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). One of the clearest examples of a sufficiency approach 
is found in Rudd v. Gen. Motors Corp., which contains the following passage:
While the inquiry into “reliable principles and methods” has been a familiar feature 
of admissibility analysis under Daubert, the new Rule 702 appears to require a trial 
judge to make an evaluation that delves more into the facts than was recommended in 
Daubert, including as the rule does an inquiry into the sufficiency of the testimony’s 
basis (“the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data”) and an inquiry into the 
application of a methodology to the facts (“the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case”).
127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (footnote omitted). This passage ends with the following 
footnote:
As will be clarified further below, this sufficiency-of-basis inquiry is formally quite 
distinct from the sufficiency-of-evidence inquiry involved in summary-judgment 
analysis, that is, Rule 702 mandates a determination of whether the expert had 
sufficient evidence (evidence which itself may or may not be admissible) to support 
his or her testimony, not a determination of whether that testimony standing alone 
provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact-finder to find for the plaintiff 
on an issue of substantive law. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee notes, 
2000 amendment (under the new rule, for purposes of determining the sufficiency of 
2018] SUFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 473
however, courts did not employ this language. Cases were generally coded 
“yes” on sufficiency when the court engaged in an “analytical gap” 
discussion.125 In other cases, we coded “yes” on the sufficiency variable 
when the judge clearly envisioned a sufficiency threshold below which 
testimony would have been inadmissible.126
                                                                                                                         
the basis of an expert’s testimony, the expert’s “facts or data” may include 
inadmissible testimony, hypothetical facts and the reliable opinions of other experts). 
Although these two inquiries turn out to resemble each other in the present case, they 
could easily diverge in other circumstances. For example, Rudd could have offered an 
expert whose testimony was geared solely towards excluding one of several 
alternative theories of accident causation. If there were a sufficient basis to establish 
the reliability of that testimony, it would be immaterial for admissibility purposes that 
that testimony, standing alone, would not also be sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment.
Id. at 1336 n.5. 
We agree with the Rudd court that there can be instances in which an expert’s testimony is 
admissible based on sufficiency, but is not sufficient to meet the party’s burden of production; the 
example proffered by the court is one such instance. This reflects the local sufficiency versus global 
sufficiency distinction we raised previously. See supra text accompanying notes 92–105. However, when 
an expert’s opinion that the plaintiff’s disease was caused by the defendant’s agent is admitted, that 
opinion is sufficient for plaintiff to meet her burden of production on factual causation, full stop.
125 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc., No. 10-1695, 2013 WL 1289050, at *4–5
(W.D. La. Mar. 26, 2013) (finding an “analytical gap” where the expert failed to reference any 
epidemiological studies in support of his proffered opinion testimony on drug toxicity); Amorgianos v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that an “analytical gap” 
existed between the conclusions reached by authors cited in an expert’s work, and the conclusions drawn 
by the expert based on those authors). Not every case that had such a discussion was coded yes, because 
the court seemed to be more focused on relevancy than reliability. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
207 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319–321 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding that the lack of probative value of proffered 
testimony would require exclusion under Daubert even if an analytical gap did not exist regarding the 
reliability of the testimony).
126 For example, in Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., the court made the following statement:
Although the Court recognizes that courts in other Parlodel[] cases have been willing 
to lower the bar of sufficiency to conform to the lack of informative data, . . . this 
Court concludes that adoption of such a shifting standard would strip Rule 702 and 
Daubert of their objective anchors by lowering the admissibility standard to meet 
whatever evidence happens to be available, regardless of its scientific unreliability.
244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (internal citation omitted). And in In re Human Tissue 
Products Liability Litigation, the court noted: 
Dr. Parisian’s conclusion, to the extent that she purports to opine that HIV, HBV, 
HCV, and syphilis are capable of being transmitted by unprocessed, cadaveric bone 
tissue that has stored [sic] at room temperature for more than thirty days, is woefully 
deficit. At no point during either her affidavit or deposition did Dr. Parisian adequately 
explain how her conclusions could be extrapolated from the results or conclusions of 
any of the studies.
582 F. Supp. 2d 644, 666 (D.N.J. 2008) (footnote omitted). Similarly, in a state case, Valentine v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 821 N.E.2d 580, 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), the court stated that “[b]ecause appellant’s
experts relied on studies that do not support the experts’ conclusions, those opinions are not scientifically 
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Opinions coded “no sufficiency” presented, if anything, even more 
problems. In no case did a judge simply say, as sometimes occurs in Frye
jurisdictions, that the only issue is relevance. Ipse dixit, i.e., an expert’s bare 
unsupported conclusion, never sufficed. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
cases where the admissibility threshold seems to be very low. The primary 
candidates for a no-sufficiency coding were the cases that pushed aside 
objections by stating that these simply went to weight and not 
admissibility.127 A second indicator of a court with minimal sufficiency 
concerns is an opinion that favorably quotes Daubert for the proposition that 
the admissibility focus should be on methodology, not conclusions.128
However, a good deal of caution is needed here. Opinions were not coded 
“no sufficiency” simply because they used this phraseology. Sometimes 
judges interject these phrases, especially the first one, at the end of their 
analyses, but a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the judges
reasonably believed there was sufficient evidence to support the experts’
positions. When the court clearly stated that there was sufficient data to 
support an expert’s position, we coded the case as “sufficiency” even if the 
court ultimately said that objections (often pointing to flaws in the quality of 
the underlying scientific studies) go to weight rather than admissibility.
Even with a close reading, a substantial number of cases could not be 
placed in either category with reasonable confidence.129 Some of these cases 
employed the no-sufficiency terms discussed above, and none of the terms 
suggested a sufficiency analysis, but nevertheless the body of the opinion 
did contain a discussion of the data upon which the expert relied. In another 
important group of cases, the court stated that in order to be admissible the 
                                                                                                                         
reliable. These studies fall far short of proving their hypothesis. They are a starting point for further 
research, not scientific proof of causation.”
127 See Lopez v. I-Flow Inc., No. CV 08-1063-PHX-SRB 2011 WL 1897548, at 2–3, 5, 6, 8 
(D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2011) (finding lack of certainty is not grounds to exclude a doctor’s testimony).
128 See Bowers v. N. Telecom, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Daubert’s 
methodology requirements).
129 To be clear, our inability to code cases in either category was based on what was written in the 
opinion and, as noted below, in some cases on our underlying knowledge of the scientific knowledge on 
the issue at hand. That is, “uncertain” is a coding category, not a statement about a judge’s true state of 
mind. If one moves beyond the four corners of a specific opinion, however, we can find cases where the 
judge reveals inconsistency or is simply uncertain about the relationship between sufficiency and 
admissibility. Meister v. Med. Engineering Corp. provides a useful example. 267 F.3d 1123, 1127 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). Several times during the trial, the judge refused to exclude the plaintiff’s experts on 
Rule 702 grounds. At the end of the plaintiff’s case, the judge refused to grant the defendant a judgment 
as a matter of law, observing that one of the plaintiff’s experts “has a theory that may or may not be 
viable, but he has testified in other cases that have no more evidence than we have here.” Id. at 1125. 
After a $10-million verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant renewed its motion. This time, the judge 
granted the motion. He ruled that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony failed to carry plaintiff’s burden 
because his reliance on case reports was an unacceptable basis for his causation opinion. It seems to us 
that it would be improper to think that the lower court applied a different standard for admissibility and 
sufficiency because, ultimately, its JMOL ruling turned on the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s expert’s 
opinion.
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expert must use reliable methods, but made no effort to analyze whether in 
the case at hand the evidence supported the expert’s conclusions.130 In one 
or two cases, even though the opinion offered little by way of analysis of the 
data upon which the expert based her opinion, our knowledge of the issue at 
hand and the existence of data linking the substance to the illness (e.g.,
Prempro and breast cancer) caused us to reject the conclusion that the 
sufficiency of the data played no role in the court’s decision. In all of these 
situations, we coded the case as “ambiguous.”131
B. Data Analysis
In this Section, we report the results of an analysis of our eighty-eight
cases. Initially, we start with some descriptive statistics. 
1. General Causation or Specific Causation
Seventy of our eighty-eight cases were coded based on statements about 
a general causation expert. Eighteen were coded based on statements about 
a specific causation expert. Recall, however, that we coded two cases twice, 
once for a general causation expert and once for a specific causation expert.
                                                                                                                         
130 Coding as “ambiguous” cases that discuss method but not data sufficiency highlights the 
relationship between the two issues. We would argue that in all admissibility decisions the primary issue 
is data sufficiency. If the data is insufficient to draw a conclusion, even the best methodology properly 
applied cannot save the day. On the other hand, when there is sufficient data, an expert can reach 
unsupported conclusions by employing inferior, shoddy methodology, i.e., drawing inferences not 
justified by the underlying data due to measurement error. What is worth noting is that the reason this is 
a problem is not because of the “unreliable” methodology per se, but because by employing it the expert 
has created a situation in which the data is no longer sufficient to support the expert’s conclusion. Had 
the expert employed a reliable method, the data would be sufficient. Understood in this way, data 
sufficiency is central to all admissibility decisions. Nevertheless, for purposes of this paper we thought 
it was preferable to keep court discussions of reliable methods and data sufficiency separate.
From a broader perspective, one could argue that any time a judge engages significantly with the 
data that bears on the expert’s testimony, regardless of what language is used, this is a sufficiency 
analysis. But for the purposes of this paper such an expansive definition seemed ill advised as stacking 
the deck too much in our favor.  
131 Students of Daubert will note that our coding paid little attention to most of the “Daubert
factors”: testing, error rate, peer review and publication, and general acceptance. As mentioned above, 
testing does get some attention when courts discuss methods. The other factors seem to play a very small 
role and admissibility decisions never seem to turn on them. In this regard, our experience is consistent 
with the findings of Meixner and Diamond: “On the whole, we found that judges faced with a Daubert
challenge often undertake a detailed analysis of the quality of the methodology used by the expert rather 
than simply relying on proxies for the quality of the method such as peer review and general acceptance.” 
Meixner & Diamond, supra note 115, at 1115.
In an early Daubert article, Professor Saks made the following observation: “But perhaps the 
purpose of the rules is simply to hold up a target to the courts; call one the Frye target and the other the 
Daubert target. The Frye ideal says: do whatever the experts tell you to do. The Daubert ideal says: 
figure out the science yourself.” Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s 
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1139 (1998). Saks 
notes that inevitably judges will do a bit of both and the Daubert factors of peer review and general 
acceptance recognize this reality. Id. But now, nearly a quarter of a century after the Daubert opinion, it 
seems clear that courts spend a majority of their effort shooting at the Daubert target.











Was the Case About a Toxic Tort?
Yes 76
No 12
Was the Case a Drug Case?
Yes 28
No 60
Was the Case State or Federal?
State 21
Federal 67
As one can see, our search and review generated mostly federal cases 
and, as we had hoped, mostly toxic tort cases. Several of the cases that did 
not involve toxic torts were drug cases which we kept even though the injury 
caused by the drug would not fit a narrow definition of a toxic injury, e.g., 
Prozac allegedly causing a suicide.
Using our search terms, we generated a substantial proportion of cases 
in which all or some of the experts were excluded. Unfortunately, we do not 
possess a relevant base rate by which we could say that this is a low or high 
percentage. Our intuition, however, is that this is higher than one would 
observe in all expert admissibility decisions because we think decisions 
denying admissibility are more likely result in written opinions. As we 
discuss below, this may have an impact on whether a court engages in a 
sufficiency analysis.132
                                                                                                                         
132 We did check to see if the year a case was decided influenced whether testimony was admitted.  
Our eighty-eight cases run from 1994 to 2016, but the distribution is lumpy and there are relatively few 
cases before 2000. There is a weak correlation between year and admissibility such that expert opinions 
are more likely to be admitted in later years. If reported cases are more likely to be ones in which the 
testimony is excluded, then this set of cases would not be good evidence of what was going on over time. 
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Finally, and most importantly, of our eighty-eight coded admissibility 
decisions, we concluded that well over half (fifty-three; 60%) did indeed 
engage in a sufficiency analysis while only eleven (13%) did not, with 
another twenty-three (26%) coded as ambiguous. This result, standing by 
itself, lends some support to our overall thesis that courts engage in a 
sufficiency analysis as we have defined it. One might fairly ask, however, 
what about the eleven cases that we coded no-sufficiency as well as the 
substantial number of ambiguous cases? In order to explore this issue, we 
looked at the correlation of several other variables on a court’s sufficiency 
judgment. Most importantly, what is the relationship between a decision to 
admit or exclude and whether the opinion engages in a sufficiency analysis? 
As one can see in Table 1, there is a strong correlation between the two.
Table 1: Sufficiency Analysis by Whether the Expert’s Testimony 




Yes Both No Other TOTAL
No 11 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 11 (13)
Ambiguous 12 (36) 4 (50) 7 (15) 0 (0) 23 (26)
Yes 10 (30) 3 (37) 38 (84) 2 (100) 53 (60)
Other 0 (0) 1 (13) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)
TOTAL 33 (100) 8 (100) 45 (100) 2 (100) 88 (100)
Obviously, whether or not an expert’s opinion is admitted is highly 
correlated with the opinion’s sufficiency analysis. If we exclude the “other” 
cases, the correlation coefficient for the remaining eighty-five cases is 0.58 
and the Ȥ2 = 32.61, df 4, p < .001. Perhaps more importantly, in 84% (38/45) 
of the cases where the testimony was excluded the court engaged in a 
sufficiency analysis, and in none of these cases did we code the opinion as a
no sufficiency analysis. On the other hand, in every case where we coded 
the opinion as not undertaking a sufficiency analysis, the court admitted the 
expert testimony. Figure 1 presents this data in graphic form, excluding the 
“other” categories.
 478 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2 
Figure 1: Sufficiency Analysis by Whether the Expert’s Testimony Is 




What should we make of this result? First, it is important to note that 
with this data we cannot attribute causation. That is, we do not know whether 
a court chose whether or not to admit the expert and to accomplish this result 
it chose to engage in a non-sufficiency or a sufficiency analysis or, on the 
other hand, the court adopted a type of analysis and this led it to the decision 
to admit or exclude.133 At this point, the most we can say is that these results 
are probably a product of both processes. If this is the case, the results lend 
                                                                                                                          
133 In order to tackle this critical question, we would need a sample where the same judge ruled 
evidence admissible in some cases and not in others. If judges remained consistent in their analysis across 
cases, this would lend support to the argument that a judge’s analysis of local sufficiency affects 
admissibility. If, on the other hand, one found judges change their rhetoric depending on whether they 
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some mild support to those who argue a sufficiency analysis is more 
restrictive than an analysis that explicitly rejects a sufficiency analysis.134
Second, we coded cases as employing a sufficiency analysis if they 
engaged in the kinds of discussions we outlined above. This does not mean 
that the sufficiency analysis is the only thing the court did. Many also 
discussed methodology and many mentioned one or more of the Daubert
factors. It is of course impossible to know which, if any, of these analyses 
was dispositive in the judge’s eyes.
Given these limitations, there are things that can be concluded from this 
result. Most importantly, when courts exclude testimony they generally do 
engage in some sufficiency analysis. Moreover, there seems to be a weak 
trend toward using a sufficiency analysis. Of the seven cases in which 
testimony was excluded and the court engaged in what we coded an 
ambiguous analysis, only two were decided after 2002.  
Another point to be made from this data is that courts do not always, or 
even usually, employ a non-sufficiency analysis when admitting evidence. 
In only one-third (11/33) of the cases in which the expert causation 
testimony was admitted did the opinion adopt this approach. Moreover, 
some of the twelve admitted expert opinion cases that we coded as 
ambiguous may have earned this code in part because the court simply did 
not make the effort to write a full analysis of its reasoning. This 
interpretation is consistent with a general observation that opinions tend to 
be more  frequent and more thorough when a court excludes an expert’s 
opinion than when a court admits it.
We were also curious as to whether courts’ opinions were more likely 
to employ a non-sufficiency analysis when assessing the admissibility of 
specific causation witnesses. We believed this might be the case because the 
evidence available to experts to assess specific causation is much softer than 
evidence on general causation.135 In fact, there is some evidence supporting 
this position. Table 2 reports the type of sufficiency analysis by type of 
expert. In 28% of the cases involving specific causation experts, the courts 
engaged in a non-sufficiency analysis. This result is marginally statistically
significant at .10.136
                                                                                                                         
134 However, we should add that even if a group of judges all use a sufficiency analysis they will 
not necessarily come to the same admissibility decision because, as we noted above, the line between 
reasonable inference and prohibited speculation is indistinct and this is true whether one is engaging in 
a local or a global sufficiency assessment.
135 For discussions of this issue, see David Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2I) Inference in 
Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 417–18, 440 (2014) (discussing the challenge courts 
face in determining “whether and how scientific knowledge derived from studying groups can be helpful 
in the individual cases before them”); Sanders, supra note 4, at 1367, 1369, 1374–75 (arguing that the 
“liberal standards applied with respect to specific causation and forensic experts” are the result of “the 
needs of law and products of science” to grapple with one another, presenting difficulties in expert 
witness admissibility standards).
136 Ȥ2 = 4.71, df 2, p < .095. 
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Table 2: Sufficiency Analysis by Type of Expert (percentages in 
parentheses) 
 




 Specific General TOTAL 
No 5 (28) 6 (9) 11 (13) 
Ambiguous 4 (22) 19 (27) 23 (26) 
Yes 9 (50) 44 (64) 53 (61) 
TOTAL 18 (100) 69 (100) 87 (100) 
 
This result is skewed because specific causation experts are more likely 
to be admitted than general causation experts. Figure 2 presents the results 
only for the cases where the testimony was admitted. 
 
Figure 2: Sufficiency Analysis by Type of Expert for Cases Where 




In only 18% (2/11) of the specific causation expert cases did the court 
engage in a sufficiency analysis. On the other hand, in 36% (8/22) of the 
general causation expert cases, the court engaged in a sufficiency analysis. 
The N is too small for this to be statistically significant but the data do trend 
in the expected direction.137 
                                                                                                                          
137 We ran several regressions and binary logistic regressions with sufficiency as the dependent 
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IV. CASES WHERE COURTS COMPARE SUFFICIENCY AND 
ADMISSIBILITY
Our data selection strategy was designed to maximize the inclusion of 
toxic tort cases. One might fairly ask if our results are peculiar to this rather 
unique set of cases. It is not the purpose of this paper to make a global 
assertion concerning the usage of a sufficiency analysis. However, it did 
seem important to us to engage in at least some check of other cases to see 
how the court handled admissibility decisions.
Ultimately, we chose to look at cases that were likely to maximize the 
discovery of non-sufficiency judgments. After reading many cases, we 
determined that one way to find such cases was to search for cases that use 
both “sufficiency” and “admissibility” in the same paragraph because many 
of these cases are drawing a distinction between the terms, often to say that 
sufficiency should be understood only in the global sufficiency sense. We 
do not mean to suggest these are a representative sample of other 
admissibility cases, but they do offer a fair opportunity to see if the toxic tort 
cases are far off the mark.
The search term “OP(daubert & sufficiency /p admissibility)” generated 
approximately 490 cases in May 2016. We examined the first 245 cases 
generated by this search. Of those cases, we ended up coding ninety-seven
on grounds similar to those discussed above. Not surprisingly, the two 
searches generated some of the same cases, but we did not delete these cases 











                                                                                                                         
admitted, whether the expert was testifying as to general or specific causation, and year. In these models 
only whether the evidence had been admitted affected sufficiency. Similar results were obtained when 
we made the dependent variable whether testimony was admitted.
138 Our decision not to exclude was based on the idea that, if our purpose was to include cases in 
which there was a heightened possibility of a non-sufficiency analysis, we should keep these cases in this 
analysis as well.




Was the Case About a Toxic Tort?
Yes 36
No 61
One of the first things worth noting is that a much higher percentage of 
these opinions admitted the expert testimony. This lends weak support for a 
general intuition that experts face a greater chance of exclusion in toxic 
cases, and indeed if we subdivide this sample into toxic and non-toxic tort 
cases, the great majority of cases not involving toxic torts admit the expert 
(46/61). Also, as we anticipated, a larger percentage of cases engaged in a 
non-sufficiency analysis. Disregarding “other” cases in both data sets, 
19% (18/95) of these cases involved non-sufficiency analyses, while 
13% (11/86) of the cases in the toxic sample did so.139 Again, the cases were 
strongly skewed to federal cases.
If we once again look at the relationship between sufficiency and 
admissibility we observe the now familiar pattern set forth in Table 3:
Table 3: Sufficiency Analysis by Whether the Expert’s Testimony Is




Yes Both No TOTAL
No 18 (31) 0 (0) 0 (0) 18 (19)
Ambiguous 26 (45) 7 (64) 5 (19) 38 (40)
Yes 14 (24) 4 (36) 21 (81) 39 (41)
TOTAL 58 (100) 11 (100) 26 (100) 95 (100)
The type of sufficiency analysis is strongly related to the admissibility 
decision (Ȥ2 = 30.25, df 4, p < .001.) All of the non-sufficiency opinions 
involved cases in which experts are admitted. If we look only at the non-
toxic cases (Table 4), the pattern remains the same, although the relationship 
is not quite significant at .05 (Ȥ2 = 8.78, df 4, p < .067).
                                                                                                                         
139 One should keep in mind that not every case in the “toxic” sample was actually a toxic tort case;
as explained above, seventy-six of eighty-eight cases were toxic tort cases.
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Table 4: Sufficiency Analysis by Whether the Expert’s Testimony Is




Yes Both No TOTAL
No 14 (31) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (23)
Ambiguous 19 (42) 3 (50) 3 (33) 25 (42)
Yes 12 (27) 3 (50) 6 (67) 21 (35)
TOTAL 45 (100) 6 (100) 9 (100) 60 (100)
This sample of cases does suggest that a sufficiency analysis is 
somewhat more prevalent in toxic tort cases, but ultimately this appears to 
be so because more experts are excluded in these toxic cases. Again, we 
must caution that this data does not allow us to make a cause-and-effect 
assessment of admissibility and sufficiency, but it does allow us to say that 
when courts exclude expert testimony they most often do so using a 
sufficiency analysis.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our two goals were to clarify the nature of sufficiency judgments used 
to rule on the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort and other cases,
and to see whether an examination of a set of toxic tort cases supported the 
position of our earlier paper that courts engage in a sufficiency analysis 
when assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.  
With respect to the first goal, we discussed several criticisms of a 
sufficiency approach. Some critics argue that our approach will be more 
lenient than the current situation, while others argue that it will be more 
restrictive. We believe that these critiques frequently fail to distinguish 
between a local sufficiency decision—whether there is sufficient data to 
support an expert’s assertions—and a global sufficiency decision—whether 
the total body of admitted evidence is sufficient to create a jury question. 
Viewed from this perspective, we continue to believe that when they are 
asked to rule on an admissibility, judges should recognize that they are being 
asked to make a local sufficiency judgment. This is the import of both the 
Joiner opinion’s analytical gap analysis and the Kumho Tire opinion’s focus 
on the case at hand. Is the science sufficient to support the expert’s 
conclusion?
With respect to the second goal, our analysis of two samples of cases 
indicates that judges do employ a sufficiency analysis in Daubert rulings. 
However, the results are not simply random. The choice of a sufficiency 
analysis is strongly correlated with a court’s decision to admit or exclude 
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expert testimony.140 When testimony is admitted, courts are more likely to 
fall back on a non-sufficiency analysis and state that challenges to the 
expert’s methods or reliability go to the weight a fact finder should give the 
evidence, not whether it is admissible.141 This seems especially likely to be 
the case when the court admits the testimony of a specific causation witness.
We should note that courts do not universally use a non-sufficiency 
analysis when admitting testimony. Just as frequently, they do undertake a 
sufficiency analysis and conclude that the data supporting the expert’s 
opinion is sufficient for the opinion to be admissible.
On the other hand, when courts do exclude expert testimony,
unsurprisingly, they never employ a non-sufficiency analysis. And of 
course, how could they? For, by definition, they have concluded that this is 
not a situation in which conclusions don’t matter and questions of 
evidentiary adequacy should simply be relegated to a jury’s weight 
assessment.
Just because a court does not employ a non-sufficiency analysis does not 
mean, however, that it has engaged in what we have defined as a sufficiency 
analysis. From one perspective, the empirical argument in our earlier paper 
is that courts do in fact conduct a sufficiency analysis when excluding an 
expert on a Daubert motion. These results suggest that while courts do not 
universally do so, we are more on the mark than not. Of the forty-five cases 
where the expert was excluded, we coded thirty-eight as engaging in a 
sufficiency analysis and the other seven as ambiguous.
And even in the group of cases discussed in Part V, a group we selected 
in an attempt to maximize the likelihood that the court would employ a non-
sufficiency analysis, in almost all such cases when experts were excluded,
the court engaged in a local sufficiency analysis.
Our small, carefully selected set of cases certainly does not provide 
much evidence about how courts approach admissibility in the Daubert
context more generally. However, it does confirm that in this particular 
corner of admissibility law, sufficiency analyses are well embedded and, if 
anything, this way of approaching admissibility is growing in favor.
We believe this to be a promising development. We hope that this 
Article will facilitate this trend by providing a clearer understanding as to 
how admissibility decisions do and should fit within the larger trial process.
                                                                                                                         
140 This result is consistent with the findings of Meixner and Diamond, supra note 115, at 1075.
141 Of course one could argue that even “goes to weight” statements simply constitute a different 
way of saying the data are sufficient to support the expert’s conclusion, i.e., create a jury question. 
But this approach does not focus on what the judge actually says, which is the focus of our analysis.
